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STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
JAMES J. MOYLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal lawmaking is often complemented and enhanced by
state and local legislation. Oftentimes the federal regulatory
scheme sets forth the minimum standards of conduct with the
states and local jurisdictions free to demand adherence to more
stringent requirements.' On the other hand, some federal regula-
tion is to be dominant with state legislation playing little, if any,
role in the scheme of things. 2 Recent state legislation in the tender
offer-take over area is in some respects inimical to the federal
regulatory pattern. It will be the purpose of this article to examine
the pertinent provisions of these state statutes with a view towards
determining their compatibility and constitutionality within the
federal framework of securities regulation.'
II. FEDERAL REGULATION
The Williams Bill4 was the response of the Congress to the
proliferating, unregulated area of tender offers. It was enacted in
1968,1 amended in 1970,6 and among other things, comprises sec-
tions 14(d), (e) and (f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
* B.S.B.A. 1969, J.D. 1971, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado; staff attorney,
Division of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.; member of the Colorado and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Witness the statement in the National Environmental Policy Act 42 U.S.C. 4321,
4371 (1969): ". . . [T]he primary responsibility for implementing this policy
[Environmental Quality Improvement] rests with State and local governments."
2. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act 49 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq. (1970); See Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973), recognizing the necessity for uniform federal
regulation of flight control, cited in Note, Commerce Clause Limitation Upon State Regu-
lation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1164-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Commerce Clause].
3. This discussion will be limited to cash tender offers. Exchange offers, involving stock
for stock swaps require registration under the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. 77a et. seq.
(1970)] and under state Blue Sky law. The Blue Sky regulatory scheme provides that the
various state securities commissioners can deny registration of an offering based upon its
investment merits. See, generally, ARANOW & EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (New York: Columbia University Press 1973) at 168-9. [hereinafter cited as
ARANOW & EINHORN].
4. CONG. REC.: S.510, 90rH CONG., 2D SESS., 114 CONG. REC. 21481 (1968).
5. Pub. L. No. 90-439 (originally enacted July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-567 (originally enacted December 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1497).
7. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d), (e) and (f) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]. Section
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This was the second attempt by Congress at regulation in this area.
An earlier bill' had been introduced to protect American compa-
nies and their management from raids by corporate "pirates." '
This bill was to require that the bidder give twenty days advance
notice to the target corporation and the Securities and Exchange
Commission of his intent to make a tender offer. This bill never
made it out of committee. In the intervening period the subject of
regulation of tender offers was accorded a great deal of discussion
by members of the Commission, various national securities ex-
changes, the industry and academia. The prevailing view ultimately
recognized the economic utility of tender offers in not only provid-
ing a swift mechanism to dispose of inefficient management,"0 but
also as a method of obtaining an investment position in a company
with relative facility. Thus, the focus of the legislation changed
from one of protecting incumbent management to one of providing
"full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal opportun-
ity to fairly present their case."'"
The congressional intent in enacting the legislation is very
clear; neither the incumbents nor the insurgents are to enjoy any
advantage over the other when five percent or more of a class of a
reporting company's equity securities become the subject of a
tender offer.12 Moreover, the investing public is to be provided with
certain material information to enable them to render an informed
investment judgment on whether to hold, sell or tender their securi-
ties.13 A proposal for pre-notification to the target company or
even the Commission was expressly rejected due to the possibility
of causing undue market fluctuations and unfairness to the bid-
14(d) et. seq. of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
[17 C.F.R. 240. 14d-1, -2, -4; 14f-1 and 13d-101 (1974) comprise what has been referred to
as, the tender offer provisions of the federal securities laws.
8. CONG. REc.: S.2731 89th Cong., Ist Sess., Ill CONG. REc. 28256 (1965).
9. See Ill CONG. REC. 28256-7 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams).
10. See Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws
43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 557 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moylan], citing ARANOW &
EINHORN, supra note 3, 66. See also 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
1I. See 113 CoNG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (Remarks of Senator Williams).
12. "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the takeover bids." 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
13. See generally, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 (5th Cir. 1974);
Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla., 1972) vacated
per stipulation Civil Action No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972).
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der." The rules promulgated, under the tender offer and antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, foster the goals of fairness
and equality and the Commission has not been hesitant to author-
ize injunctive actions to prevent any party from taking unfair ad-
vantage. 5
III. STATE REGULATION
Despite the clear expression of congressional intent to balance
the various competing interests to the benefit of the investing pub-
lic, several states have thumbed their noses at the principles pro-
pounded in the Williams Act. Some did so in such an overt and
deliberate manner as to raise serious questions about their mo-
tives."6
14. Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 44
(1968) (remarks of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange.)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 House Hearings]. See also Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW 149, 152-3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohen];
cf. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.
J. 231 [hereinafter cited as Manne].
15. See SEC v. Weisberger, 74 Civ. 4450 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1974); Complaint summa-
rized at CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,827 (1974); Consent injunction obtained against
individuals violating Section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970)] of the Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-4 [17 C.F.R. 240. lOb-4 (1974)], promulgated thereunder. This is the "short tendering
rule" and designed to promote the policy of giving all tendering shareholders the right to
have their shares, beneficially owned at the time of the offer, taken up pro rata, Section
14(d)(6) [15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(6) (1970)]; SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Inc., Civ. Act No. 74-
3634 (S.D.N.Y. August 21, 1974); Complaint summarized at CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1
94,767 (1974). Permanent injunction by consent to prohibit the company and some of its
employees from executing transactions in securities they know to be involved in tender
offers due to their printing of the tender offer soliciting materials; see also, SEC v. Healey,
74 Ciy. 4305 (S.D.N.Y. October 1, 1974) and SEC v. Cox, 74 Civ. 3363 (N.D. Ill. Novem-
ber 26, 1974) involving complaints for injunctions against the defendants for trading in the
securities of an issuer which the defendant knew would become the subject of a tender offer.
16. To their credit the states of Illinois and Pennsylvania did not pass takeover legisla-
tion although each had considered bills to protect local companies. In Illinois the legislation
was introduced in response to Ling-Tempco-Vought's acquisition of Wilson and Co. and
the takeover of Armour and Co. by General Host. Pennsylvania had to grapple with such
legislation because of the attempts to takeover Sharon Steel Corp., Piper Aircraft and
Westinghouse Air Brake Co. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender
Offer, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 767, 768-9 n.10 (1971), [hereinafter cited as 46 N.Y.U. L. REv.].
Pennsylvania, however, announced that a bidder in a "cash takeover bid" is deemed a dealer
in securities and is required to register. Pa. Sec. Comm. Bull. June 1, 1969, 3 CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP. 1 41,336 (1969). Illinois was almost persuaded to enact similar special legisla-
tion with respect to countering Loew's Corp.'s tender offer for CNA Financial Corp., an
Illinois based company. See Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1974 p. 8 Col. 3.
It should also be noted that Kansas recently enacted its own "Takeover Bid Disclosure
Law" incorporating various features of the other states' statutes in this area, KAN. STAT.
ANN. 17-1276 et. seq. (Supp. 1975). However, since it does not apply to companies regis-
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The states enacting such legislation advance several rationales
for assuming authority over tender offers for companies incorpo-
rated in or based within their respective boundaries. They first
proclaim the need to afford investors additional protections in this
area. They then proclaim that they are acting out of a concern for
the takeover bid's effect upon competition, the efficiency of the
target corporation, local versus decentralized control of the entity,
debt-equity structure and the concomitant impact on the target's
management, employees, customers, suppliers and creditors. 17 Fur-
ther justification is based on the grounds that states have a legiti-
mate interest in the internal affairs of a corporation and thus can
legitimately legislate in this area. 18
It is submitted, however, that this type of state legislation is a
reaction to the fear that such a bid will adversely effect the local
economy. 9 This is evidenced by the fact that even though tender
offers are used for purposes other than obtaining control of a
corporation,"0 state legislation has denominated all tender offers
"take-overs." It will become clear that some provisions of the
various state statutes are designed to protect incumbent manage-
ment against the insurgents and are not for the protection of inves-
tors. In fact, in some instances management is benefited to the
detriment of the shareholders. It is little wonder that incorporation
in these states is considered a good defensive tactic to a tender
offer.'
A. Ohio
The Ohio Takeover Act"2 is one of the most glaring examples
of special interest legislation." It was enacted in response to the
bid by Northwest Industries, Inc. for B. F. Goodrich & Co., an
tered under the Exchange Act [KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-1285 (Supp. 1975)] it is inapposite to
this discussion.
17. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 756 (1970), [hereinafter cited as Shipman].
18. Id. at 724.
19. Accord, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 768.
20. See Moylan, supra note 10.
21. Vaughan, Tender Offers in Virginia, 7 THE REViEW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
879 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vaughan]. For other defensive tactics, see also, ARANOW
& EINHORN, supra note 3, chapter 9 "Defensive Tactics to Thwart a Tender Offer" at 219-
74; Yoran (Jurkevitz), Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 AM. J. OF
COMP. L. 531 (1973).
22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 et. seq. (Page Supp. 1973).
23. Accord, Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What is it? 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
681, 720 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sommer].
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Ohio based company. 24 Although the Ohio bill's proponents paid
lip-service to investor protection it was quite evident that the legis-
lation was proposed to protect the management of Ohio's indus-
tries.2"
In pertinent part, the Ohio act virtually precludes a cash tender
offer for an Ohio based company? The law requires that the of-
feror publicly announce the terms of the offer and file the soliciting
materials with the Division of Securities and send them to the
target corporation twenty days prior to the effective date of any
bid for ten percent or more of a class of the target's outstanding
securities.2 The bid is not thereafter self-effective. A hearing can
be ordered by the Division or upon a finding of cause under a
request of the target corporation.2 9 It should not be too difficult for
a target corporation adverse to a tender offer to frame at least one
plausible issue worthy of a hearing.
The hearing is primarily concerned with the adequacy and ac-
curacy of the bidder's disclosure but additionally can result in
denial of effectiveness if any provision of the Ohio Blue Sky Law
is found to have been violated." Aside from the disclosure re-
quired under the tender offer provisions of the federal securities
laws, Ohio requires additional disclosure3 by the bidder which is
comparable to the disclosure required by an issuer in a registration
statement filed pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.32 Although
the amount of disclosure required is burdensome, it is the provision
for the hearing and its duration which is the death knell of a tender
offer for an Ohio based company. The Act provides that a hearing
be held within forty days of the filing and that the issues be adjudi-
cated within sixty days of the filing.3 Since a tender offer de-
24. See 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 768-69 n.10.
25. See Vorys, Ohio Tender Offer Bill, 43 OHfo BAR 65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Vorys].
26. Accord 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 767; Sommer, supra note 23, at 720.
27. The Ohio Act applies to any company incorporated in Ohio or a company which
has its principal place of business in the state and substantial assets there. OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041 (A)(1) (Page Supp. 1973).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1973).
29. Id.
30. See, Shipman, supra note 17, at 735.
31. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(3)(g) and (h) (Page Supp. 1973).
32. 15 U.S.C. 77a et. seq. (1970) [hereinafter Securities Act]. Accord, Shipman, supra
note 17, at 733; 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 774.
33. OHIo REV. CoDa ANN. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1973). Under federal law a
tender offeree may withdraw shares tendered if not taken up after sixty days of the date of
the offer, 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5) (1970).
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pends upon speed and surprise for its effectiveness, the hearing and
pre-filing requirements can nullify the success of the tender offer.34
Even though the nullification of the tender offer is deemed
"good" by select parties in Ohio and "bad" by the bidder, there
are other aspects of the law which are detrimental to the target's
shareholders, the investing public and the national market for the
company's securities. The hiatus and uncertainty created by a
hearing could cause the exchange upon which the securities are
listed for trading, and the Commission, to halt or suspend trading
in the target's securities until final adjudication in order to avoid
a chaotic market. 35 In such an event everyone suffers at the ex-
pense of protecting incumbent management.
The Ohio Act also has several other provisions which can prove
irksome to a bidder in addition to being contrary to federal law.
A bidder, who in the preceding year obtained five percent or more
of the specified class of security of the target without giving notice
of his intent to acquire control cannot publish a tender offer for
additional shares for another year.36 In addition, any takeover bid
must be made by an Ohio based securities dealer.3 1 Interestingly,
the Ohio Act allows the target great latitude, within the confines
of avoiding fraudulent activity, to combat the offer.38
The Act does comport with federal legislation through its adop-
tion of the Williams Bill's remedial provisions including the right
of withdrawal within seven days of the offer,39 but it does not offer
final withdrawal rights after sixty days. It also provides for pro
rata acceptance of shares tendered" and the highest, uniform price
34. See Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1136; accord, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra
note 16, at 775; Shipman, supra note 17, at 730.
35. See Statement by the New York Stock Exchange on Amend. Sub. S.D. No. 138
File No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969) reported at BNA SEc. REG. AND L. REP. No. at A 11-12
(1969). The New York and American Stock Exchanges for example have authority to halt
trading in securities listed for trading on their boards. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Constitution Art. III, § 7 (1973); American Stock Exchange, Constitution Art. II § 2
(1972). The SEC has statutory authority to suspend trading in a company's securities for
ten day periods, 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(5) (1970) over the counter market; 15 U.S.C. 78s(a)(4)
(1970) listed securities.
36. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1973).
37. Orio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973). The same is true in
Pennsylvania, note 15 supra.
38. See Shipman, supra note 17, at 737.
39. Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973); 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5)
(1970).
40. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973); 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(6)
(1970).
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to all tendering shareholders."
While the Ohio Act contains additional provisions and other
variations on the tender offer provisions of the federal securities
laws, the ones discussed above are the most substantive and the
most inimical to the federal regulatory scheme.
B. Virginia
The "Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act ' 42 passed in 1968 by the
Virginia legislature is purported to be a disclosure statute closely
akin to the Williams Bill.43 It was not until the Act was amended
in 1970 that it assumed the character of special interest legislation.
The amendments provide for a twenty day pre-filing of the cash
or exchange offer with the State Corporation Commissioner and
the target corporation's registered agent. 44 The filing is required
whenever a bidder seeks to obtain ten percent of the securities of
a non-exempt 4 target corporation which is incorporated in Vir-
ginia and doing business in the state.41
The 1970 amendments also granted the Commissioner author-
ity to order a hearing within ten days of filing on its own motion
or at the request of the target corporation if cause therefore is
found.47 A hearing must be commenced within forty days of the
date of filing.4 The issues to be determined at the hearing relate
primarily to the adequacy and accuracy of the bidder's disclosure,
which, like the Ohio Act, embellishes the federal disclosure stan-
dards by requiring information which is of questionable relevance
to a shareholder facing a decision regarding whether he should sell,
tender or hold the security.49 No such burdens are placed upon the
41. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973); 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(7)
(1970).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 et. seq. (Supp. 1973).
43. Vaughan, supra note 21, at 779.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a) (Supp. 1973).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b) (Supp. 1973). The exemptions closely parallel those
in the Williams Bill, Vaughan note 21 supra, at 779-80.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(e) and (i) (Supp. 1973).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1973).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-534(b) (Supp. 1973).
49. The offer must contain: financial statements for the past three fiscal years and the
current quarter, the names and biographical summaries of the offer's directors and executive
officers, descriptions of the company's equity securities and long-term debt, the current
business of the company and its subsidiaries for the past five years and its projected busi-
ness, properties of the company and its subsidiaries, non-routine legal proceedings, and any
material transactions between the bidder and its officers and directors within the preceding
three years. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(b)(vii) (Supp. 1973). Of course, the commission can
1975]
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target corporation except that any recommendations must not run
afoul of the federal anti-fraud provisions and must be filed with the
corporation commission.'
Substantively, the Virginia Act requires the highest, uniform
price to all tendering shareholders. 51 It also provides for pro rata
acceptance of shares tendered, but it extends the tender offer de-
posit period from the initial ten days to a deposit period of twenty-
one days to thirty-five days" and a withdrawal period lasting until
the twenty-first day of the offer. 53 This is in direct variance to the
seven day withdrawal period provided by federal legislation, 54 al-
though the thirty-five day provision falls within the sixty day final
withdrawal period provided by federal statute. 5  The lengthy de-
posit period of twenty-one days also conflicts with the ten day
duration of a nationwide offer required by section 14(d)(6) of the
Exchange Act.56 In many instances, especially when the offer is for
less than all the shares outstanding, more shares are deposited
pursuant to the offer than the offeror is bound to accept. The
Williams Act provides for pro rata acceptance of those shares
tendered within the first ten day period and thereafter on a first
come, first serve basis if additional shares are to be taken down."
The provision allowing for a twenty-one day deposit and with-
drawal period benefits the target corporation, but it is at odds with
the federal statutes and precludes their effectuation. In the alterna-
tive, compliance with federal law will, in some instances, cause the
bidder to violate state law, creating an intolerable situation.
In addition, the Virginia statute bestows a different status upon
the Virginia shareholder by granting him rights different from his
non-Virginia counterpart. Thus the Virginia Act is arguably con-
trary to the egalitarian principles embodied in the Williams Act.
Finally, Virginia, like Ohio has made a brazen attempt to ex-
tend its regulation of tender offers to those offers made to non-
residents of Virginia for Virginia based companies and to those
order additional disclosure, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(b) (Supp. 1973). See generally,
Vaughan, supra note 21, at 880.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-532 (Supp. 1973). See generally, Vaughan, note 21, supra,
at 881.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-530(d) (Supp. 1973).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-530(a) (Supp. 1973).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-530(b) (Supp. 1973).
54. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5) (1970).
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(6) (1970).
57. Id.
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offers made exclusively outside the state. The statute's feature of
extra-territoriality raises questions as to its constitutionality."
C. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin statute 9 applies to those non-exempt" takeover
offers for five percent" of the equity securities of a corporation
organized under the laws of the state, or which has its principal
place of business and substantial portion of its assets located within
the state.62
The statute requires registration of the tender offer or non-
exempt exchange offer by filing it with the State Securities Com-
missioner and the transmittal of the offer to the principal office of
the target corporation by certified mail.6" In addition, public dis-
closure of the material terms of the offer must be made not later
than the time of filing. 4 The disclosure required in the registration
statement is very similar to the disclosure of information contained
on the Schedule 13D statement65 filed pursuant to section 14(d)(1)
of the Exchange Act6 and Rule 14d-1 promulgated thereunder.
Additional disclosure of information about the bidder, of the type
required by the Ohio and Virginia Acts, is similarly required by
the Wisconsin statute.68 Again, disclosure of information relating
to the bidder's legal origins, capitalization, real estate, etc., is of
dubious value to a tender offeree. Even if it is deemed relevant, a
shareholder will have ready access to the information since most
tender offers are made by public corporations already subject to
the reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. 9 Thus, if
58. See 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. note 16, supra, at 772. It is questionable whether a nation-
wide offer, precluding shareholders of Virginia would be acceptable under federal standards.
This issue, however, has never been adjudicated. But see, discussion at note 121, inIra.
59. Wis. STAT. § 552.01 et. seq. (1973).
60. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(5)(a)-(g) (1973).
61. Wis. STAT. § 552.01(5) (1973).
62. Wis. STAT. § 552.01(6) (1973).
63. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(1) (1973).
64. Id.
65. 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-101 (1974).
66. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1970).
67. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-1 (1974).
68. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(2)(c), (d) and (3) (1973).
69. 15 U.S.C. 78m and o(d) (1974). Private tender offerors perhaps should be subjected
to additional state disclosure requirements, though many provide financial and other infor-
mation, since the recent case of Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone and Sons, 448 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1973) which affirmed the district court's determination that a private corporation's
failure to disclose financial information violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange
Act notwithstanding the fact that Schedule 13D does not require disclosure of financial
1975]
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he is so disposed, a shareholder can ascertain whatever information
he requires. Obviously, requiring make-weight disclosure is purely
a protective tactic to cause a tender offeror to incur increased
expenses and render the undertaking more complex, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood that the target can find a plausible claim
to raise before a state or judicial tribunal. With the necessity of
overcoming these obstacles, it is no wonder that it requires a well-
endowed bidder to seek an interest in a Wisconsin based company.
The Wisconsin statute also provides that ten days after the
filing of the registration statement the offer will become effective
unless the commissioner orders a delay to rectify disclosure,70 or
orders a hearing on his own motion or upon request of the target's
board of directors.7 If a hearing is ordered it must commence
within twenty days of the date of the filing and a determination
must be made within thirty days of the close of the hearing unless
this time is mutually extended.7"
The Act does not attempt to interfere with the activities of the
target corporation in defending against the takeover except to the
extent of admonishing that the solicitation material published by
the target must not contain fraudulent statements. 73 Finally, the
rights of withdrawal, pro ration and highest price are virtually
identical to those found in section 14(d) of the Exchange Act.74
D. Minnesota
The Minnesota "Corporate-Take-Over Law"75 is a close rela-
tive to Wisconsin's law and similar to other state legislation in this
area. It too applies to any non-exempt 7 tender offer or non-exempt
exchange offer for more than ten percent77 of an equity security of
a corporation organized under Minnesota law or whose principal
place of business and substantial assets are located in the state.
This legislation requires that the offer shall not be effective
until at least ten days after the material terms thereof are disclosed
information. See also, ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §606(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1-3 re-
vised) which calls for a bidder's disclosure of financial information (October 1, 1974).
70. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(3) (1973).
71. WIs. STAT. § 552.05(4) (1973). Because of the directors' fiduciary responsibilities,
they may be compelled to seek a hearing.
72. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(5) (1973).
73. WIs. STAT. § 552.07(1) and (2) (1973).
74. WIs. STAT. § 552.11 (1973).
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 01 et. seq. (Supp. 1973).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 01 Subd. 8(a)-( (Supp. 1973).
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 01 Subd. 8 (Supp. 1973).
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to investors" and the registration statement is filed with the State
Commissioner of Securities and sent to the principal offices of the
target by certified mail.79 The Commissioner may summarily order
a delay of the effectiveness of the offer if it is necessary to promote
full disclosure of all facts deemed material."0 The Commissioner
may also order a hearing within ten days on his own motion or at
the request of the target's board of directors or upon signed peti-
tion of shareholders owning, in the aggregate, ten percent of the
target's securities which are the subject of the takeover., Appar-
ently, the target need only request a hearing in Wisconsin and
Minnesota and it will be granted. In Ohio and Virginia there must
be a finding of cause whenever the target seeks to initiate a hearing.
Of course, it is not likely that the target will bear any great burden
in persuading a state securities commissioner that there is cause for
a hearing. 2
The hearing, if ordered, must be held within twenty days of the
filing date and a decision must be rendered within twenty days of
the close of the hearing unless mutually extended. A finding of
inadequate disclosure or violation of Minnesota Blue Sky Law is
grounds for denial of registration. 4
Consistent with the various state legislative schemes, there are
practically no legal impediments to the activities of the target ex-
cept the usual prohibitions against violations of the state and fed-
eral anti-fraud provisions. 5 Finally, the Act comports with the
federal remedial provisions of the Williams Act regarding with-
drawal rights, pro rata acceptance of shares deposited within the
first ten days and highest uniform price to all tendering sharehold-
ers.8 1
E. Nevada
The Nevada "Takeover Bid Disclosure Law" 87 is not a carbon
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 03 Subd. I (Supp. 1973). Disclosure requires, at a
minimum, the mailing of the tender offer registration statement to all state broker-dealers
quoting the security.
79. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 03 Subd. 1 (Supp. 1973).
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 03 Subd. 3 (Supp. 1973).
81. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 03 Subd. 4 (Supp. 1973).
82. Accord, Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1150-1.
83. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 03 Subd. 5 (Supp. 1973).
84. Id.
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 04 Subd. I (Supp. 1973); 15 U.S.C. 78j and n(e) (1970);
17 C.F.R. 240. lOb-5 (1974).
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 06 Subd. 2, 3 and 4 (Supp. 1973).
87. NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.376 et. seq. (Supp. 1973).
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copy of the legislation passed by the other states.88 It contains a
few provisions unique onto itself, including that it applies only to
companies incorporated under Nevada law.88 It applies to any non-
exempt offer, by advertisement or other form of oral or written
communication, to acquire shares of the target corporation when
the offeror will own, in the aggregate, over ten percent of the
company's securities."
The statute does require the filing of an information statement
containing the disclosures required on the statement filed on
Schedule 13D. The filing need only be made with the resident agent
of the target ten days prior to the making of the offer.9 No admin-
istrative hearings are provided for; resort to the courts is all that
appears contemplated."
The statute, like its federal counterpart, requires that the high-
est price is paid to all tendering shareholders.13 Like Virginia, it
substantially changes the deposit and withdrawal periods from
seven to sixty days 94 to twenty-one to thirty-five days. 5 The pro
ration provisions are contained in the statute but, under Nevada
law, all securities tendered are subject to pro ration for the life of
the offer." One cannot help but wonder how a tender offeror bid-
ding for more than ten percent but less than one hundred percent
of the securities of the target will be able to comply with federal
and Nevada law if his tender offer is successful on the eleventh day
of the offer, especially when he reserves the right to take down
more shares than those originally sought. Under federal law, secur-
ities tendered during the first ten days of the offer must be taken
up pro rata, 7 on the eleventh day and all subsequent days it is first
come-first served. On the eleventh day a tendering shareholder
from the state of Nevada has a state cause of action if his shares
are not accepted. Again, the situation arises where compliance with
one law either precludes compliance with or violates other law.
88. The Nevada statute took effect on March 4, 1969. It is one year less one day younger
than the original Virginia statute and seven months older than the Ohio statute. The Wis-
consin and Minnesota statutes were the last to be enacted.
89. NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3765 (Supp. 1973).
90. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.377(a) and (b) (Supp. 1973).
91. NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3771(1) (Supp. 1973).
92. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3774 (Supp. 1973).
93. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(4) (Supp. 1973).
94. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5) (1970).
95. NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(1) and (2) (Supp. 1973).
96. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(3) (Supp. 1973).
97. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(6) (1970).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Pre-Emption
Section 28 of the Exchange Act9" provides:
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions)
of any State over any security of any person insofar as it does
not conflict with the provisions of this title of the rules and
regulations thereunder.99
It has been argued that this language is an adequate expression
of the Congress' intent to pre-empt the field of securities regula-
tion. ' However, state and federal regulation of securities has ex-
isted side by side for many years."' The rights of states to regulate
the securities area has long been established. In fact, the states
appear to have been there first.102 Blue Sky legislation has not been
considered to be subject to pre-emption when it complements
rather than conflicts with the federal regulatory pattern. This is not
the case with state regulation of tender offers. This special interest
legislation is not only inconsistent with the federal regulatory
scheme, but on many fronts, is "in conflict" with the federal act. 03
98. 15 U.S.C. 78bb (1970).
99. Id.
100. Vaughan, supra note 21, at 881; Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1167-70;
accord, Note, Statutory Comments: Takeover Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
323, 333 (1969).
101. I. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 28 (2d ed. 1961). Compare, Millonzi,
Concurrent Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional
Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REV. 1483 (1963) cited by 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at
784 n.93.
102. The Supreme Court, in three early cases held that state securities regulation did
not violate the 14th Amendment or unduly burden interstate commerce. Merrick v. N. W.
Halsey and Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S.
559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
103. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), which sets forth the follow-
ing test to determine if an area has been pre-empted by federal legislation.
(1) ". . . '[T]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so persuasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.'" 350 U.S. at 502.
(Quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
(2) ". . . [T]he federal statutes 'touch a field in which the federal interest is so dom-
inant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject.'" 350 U.S. at 504. (Quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
(3) ". . . [E]nforcement of the state [law] presents a serious danger of conflict with
the administration of the federal program." 350 U.S. at 505.
See also Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1163. Compare Joseph E. Seagrams and
Sons v. Hofstetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966) cited by Vaughan, supra note 21, at 882, but
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Certainly, the provisions of the takeover legislation enacted in
Nevada, Minnesota, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin, which in whole
or in part require burdensome and unnecessary disclosure through
pre-filing and early disclosure of the tender offer registration state-
ments, hearings and their consequent delays, along with substantial
modifications of the federal remedial provisions, are adverse to the
congressional intent' expressed in the Williams Act. All of the
state requirements redound to the benefit of the target corporation
by eliminating the essential elements of surprise and speed and
leaving management unencumbered to wage its battle for self-
perpetuation. But not only is the state legislation contrary to the
philosophy of the federal act, it has been shown that various state
statutory provisions differ to the extent of being in conflict with
federal legislation." 5 In addition, a bidder's failure to disclose that
his tender offer is in violation of state law is a material fact, argua-
bly required to be disclosed under the anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act. Moreover, the practical effect of state tender offer
legislation, to preclude tender offers and perpetuate management,
is sufficient to find them "in conflict" with the Williams Act and
consequently pre-empted. 1°0 Thus, it appears that the federal tender
offer legislation pre-empts state regulation not only on philosophi-
cal and substantive grounds but upon general policy grounds as
well.
B. Commerce Clause
Even more fundamental than the arguments surrounding the
application of the pre-emption doctrine is the issue of whether state
regulation of tender offers constitutes such a burden on interstate
commerce as to violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.' °0 In order for such a finding to be made, it must be
shown that the state's regulatory activities place an excessive bur-
den upon interstate commerce. 08 The original Blue Sky legislation
note in the Court's opinion, the emphasis placed upon the 21st Amendment in finding no
Commerce Clause violation.
104. Accord, Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1168-70.
105. See text at 698 discussing compliance with section 14(d)(6) [15 U.S.C. 78nd(6)
(1970)] in the face of pro rata acceptance during the entire course of the offer. See text at
13 discussing extended withdrawal rights which are in direct conflict with section 14(d)(5)
[15 U.S.C. 78n(d)5 (1970)].
106. Accord, Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1170. Compare, Vaughan, supra note
2, at 882.
107. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
108. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Huron Cement Co. v.
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was found to comport with the federal legislative scheme. 19 It has
withstood constitutional challenge because it promotes the legiti-
mate state interest of attempting to assure that individuals within
the state's boundaries are not subjected to fraudulent securities
transactions.110 The takeover legislation enacted by the various
states has extra-territorial application. We have seen that the var-
ious acts are designed to "protect" all shareholders of the target
corporation no matter where their place of residence."' Some stat-
utes also make illegal an offer for the securities of a target corpora-
tion which excludes the residents of the target state.112
Aside from the extra-territorial application of the various state
acts, the provisions requiring disclosure of innumerable and var-
ious items places an unwarranted burden upon the offeror and is
discriminatory, since the target is not held to the same rigorous
standards of disclosure in combating a tender offer or purchasing
its own shares.113 The advance notice requirement is not only con-
trary to the fundamental purpose of the Williams Act"' but also
contains the potential to generate uncertainty and chaos in the
nationwide market for the target's and bidder's securities."1 Cer-
tainly, should any state order a hearing on the tender offer it would
not only be impossible for the offer to be concluded elsewhere, but
also, as a practical matter, it would kill the offer."' The offer would
have to be extended until the issues raised were resolved, and the
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10
(1928). See generally, Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1152-62.
109. See note 102 supra, and accompanying text.
110. See Shipman, supra note 17, at 740; L. Loss & E. CowEar, BLUE SKY LAW 173,
cited in Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1153.
111. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 01 Subd. 9 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3765
(Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-529(e) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. § 552.01(6) (1973).
112. OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80B.06 Subd. I (Supp. 1973). See, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 772.
113. Commerce Clause, supra note 2 at 1147.
114. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text. Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at
1147. In addition, advance disclosure of an exchange offer required to be registered pursuant
to the Securities Act may violate the "Gun Jumping" provisions of Section 5 of the Act
[15 U.S.C. 77e (1970)]; 46 N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 16, at 775.
115. See note 35 supra, and accompanying text.
116. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 59 (1967). (Remarks on S. Hayes III); ARANOW &
EINHORN, supra note 3, at 11; Commerce Clause supra note 2, at 1136. See also, Vorys,
supra note 25, "I suspect, so far as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are concerned the
corporate takeover, as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the past. Acquisitions will
hereafter be negotiated." at 73.
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shareholders were again on equal footing. Moreover, the time pe-
riod provided for from initiation of the hearing until decision, not
counting the time involved in litigation, could well extend the
tender offer past the sixty day deadline, thus allowing shareholders
the right to exercise their federal rights of withdrawal."7 It is ap-
parent that Congress did not contemplate delaying tactics to mili-
tate against the success of a tender offer. Such tactics are in con-
flict with the federal law. Congress recognized that tender offers
serve legitimate and useful economic functions such as ousting
inefficient management, 8 increasing premiums for shares," 9 and
eliminating partial restraints on alienation.' The state legislation
described here definitely constitutes an excessive burden on the free
flow of securities in interstate commerce.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress obviously took great pains to strike an equitable bal-
ance among the competing interests in tender offers and at the
same time provided substantive protections to the investing public.
State statutes which are designed to protect incumbent manage-
ment are adverse to the interests of the tender offeror and tender
offerees as well as violative of the United States Constitution and
the federal securities laws. Such legislation cannot be tolerated.
It may take a gutsy bidder, with sufficient time and money, to
challenge the validity of this type of state legislation.' 2' Alterna-
tively, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Congress
could advocate legislation pre-empting the field before a panoply
of varied and conflicting state legislation is passed, further muddy-
117. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5) (1970).
118. Aa Now & EINHORN, supra note 3, at 5, 66; 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
119. Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1171 citing Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110, 113 (1965).
120. Commerce Clause, supra note 2, at 1171-2.
121. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 3. One attempt was made in Sparton Corp.
v. Ward, No. 243, 230 (C.P. Ct. Franklin City, Ohio, January 8, 1971) No. 71-8 (Ct. App.
Franklin City, Ohio, January 12, 1971) where a New York bidder made an offer for the
securities of an Ohio based company outside the state and prior to the expiration of twenty
days from the time of the public announcement of the offer. The target company sued the
Ohio Securities Commissioner and he was ordered to hold a hearing on the target's claims.
The target then appealed to obtain a temporary injunction which was imposed on the
bidder's solicitation pending the outcome of the Commissioner's hearing. At this juncture,
however, the offer was withdrawn, at 161-2. Hence, the issues raised are still not settled
but there is little doubt that the litigation influenced the bidder's decision to withdraw the
offer.
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ing these waters and further entrenching incumbent management
through the elimination of the most efficient vehicle for holding
them to account-the tender offer.
* Editor's Note: Finally, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana and South Dakota are currently
debating or have just passed tender offer legislation.
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